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SYMPOSIUM ON COVID-19, GLOBAL MOBILITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE CONTESTED BOUNDARIES OF EMERGING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW
IN THE POST-PANDEMIC
Ian M. Kysel* & Chantal Thomas**
One measure of how and whether the COVID-19 pandemic reshapes the emerging ﬁeld of international migration law will be the extent to which transnational civil society and activist movements can counteract the intensiﬁcation of state border controls that the pandemic has triggered. Before the pandemic, transnational efforts to
establish a new normative framework for migration seemed to be accelerating. These efforts included new, if nonbinding, global compacts on refugees and migration, and new, if modest, efforts at facilitating global cooperation,
alongside innovative approaches to scholarly engagement.1 Such developments arguably contributed to an emerging framework for protecting migrants under international law. Has the pandemic defeated this potential? State
responses to the pandemic have eschewed multilateralism, brought migration to a near standstill, and ignored
well-established human rights obligations. Moreover, states are poised to deploy a range of new border management
technologies and even more assertively manage migration in the name of “health prooﬁng” borders.2 Yet at the same
time, some progressive state practices have emerged alongside a call from the UN Secretary-General to “reimagine
human mobility for the beneﬁt of all.”3 In this essay, we chart some areas of potentially progressive expansion beyond
the status quo, noting not only the substance but also the process by which these norms are emerging.
An Opportunity for Progressive Development of the Law?
In one important sense, the COVID-19 pandemic has provided an object lesson in the nature of international
migration law. This law has been portrayed by scholars as “a work in progress” and “substance without architecture.”4 The status quo remains a system marked by failed multilateralism and legal fragmentation. The movement
of people crossing international borders is often governed in harmfully chaotic ways. While there are several global
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Migrants Bill of Rights Initiative, Cornell Law School, United States.
** Radice Family Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Cornell Law School, United States.
1
See Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Doc. A/Res/73/195 (Dec. 19, 2018); Global Compact on Refugees,
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fora for coordinating state responses to migration, the primary engines of this coordination to date have been
regional and enforcement-centric. There is no global treaty which allocates or organizes migration ﬂows. The
new UN Network on Migration has fostered discussion in the midst of the pandemic and issued useful policy
guidance, but it does not yet appear to have emerged as a signiﬁcant locus for state cooperation on the response.
It is likewise a truism to say that the rights of migrants, including refugees, have been incompletely protected by a
fragmented patchwork of international institutions and norms. There is, of course, no widely-ratiﬁed treaty restating the rights of all migrants. These features have often intensiﬁed the most extreme of human consequences, even
more so in times of crises like the current pandemic.
Against this background, scholars, including the two of us, have sought to promote a more integrated ﬁeld.5
This movement towards greater internationalization, of course, has been both vulnerable to nationalistic political
contestation for the protections it has sought to reinforce, and subject to critiques for its shortcomings. From
within a human rights framework, instruments like the new Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular
Migration have at times appeared ambiguous. On the one hand, they reinforce the propriety of addressing
migrants’ rights as an objective of international law rather than the exclusive domain of national sovereigns.
Yet, on the other, they arguably bear an equivocal relationship to existing rights and progressive rights jurisprudence, if only because they inconsistently reﬂect the content of treaty obligations.6 Moreover, a vantage point more
critical of the human rights frame generally has argued that pursuing the goal of “global cooperation,” as it has
emerged in the migration context, has not redounded to migrants’ beneﬁt, and instead has facilitated or at least
legitimated schemes of border control and repatriation.7 And, ﬁnally, there remains the vital question of the efﬁcacy and enforceability of a globalized migration law. Notwithstanding these many ﬂaws, we assert that the ﬁeld,
protean and fragmented as it has been, has also provided moments of opportunity and contestation to shape
human rights discourse in a way that would value the humanity of migrants over the prerogative of states.
The pandemic cannot change, and may exacerbate, some of the biggest near-term drivers of migration: conﬂict,
climate change, and socioeconomic dislocation. Yet we may also be on the cusp of a new era of state restriction and
assertive management of migration, with states attempting to “health-proof ” migration through public healthjustiﬁed testing and surveillance regimes, limitations on entry, and expanded reliance on overseas processing—
all of which will have consequences far beyond any dividend to health. Practically, these restrictions may radically
limit the freedom to move, further concentrating the ability to migrate among the most structurally empowered
and amplifying the law’s excesses when it comes to policing the bodies and movement of migrants. Insofar as
global migration regimes can check these restrictive trends, they have arguably never been more important.
And there may be some grounds for optimism.
The work of civil society movements has long served as something of a counterbalance to the anemic investment by states in multilateral cooperation to facilitate migration and protect a baseline of migrants’ rights. Civil
society has played a key role in agenda-setting in the ﬁeld, both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Given
5

The two of us have contributed to this integration from different perspectives—one arguing for an undergirding ethics that accommodates fragmentation and supports a new migration politics; the other arguing for a comprehensive soft law bill of migrants’ rights to
promote crystallization of international human rights law protecting all migrants. See Chantal Thomas, What Does the Emerging International
Law of Migration Mean for Sovereignty, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 392, 447, 449-50 (2013); Ian M. Kysel, Promoting the Recognition and Protection of the Rights
of All Migrants Using a Soft-Law International Migrants Bill of Rights, 4 J. MIGRATION & HUMAN SEC. 29, 32 (2016).
6
See Andrea Spagnolo, We are Tidying up: The Global Compact on Migration and its International with International Human Rights Law, EJIL TALK!,
(Mar. 1, 2019); Justin Gest et al., Protecting and Benchmarking Migrants’ Rights: An Analysis of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular
Migration, 57 INT’L MIGRATION 60 (2019).
7
Marie-Bénédicte Dembour has critically pointed to the “Strasbourg reversal.” See MARIE-BÉNÉDICTE DEMBOUR, WHEN HUMANS
BECOME MIGRANTS: STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITH AN INTER-AMERICAN COUNTERPOINT 184-87 (2015).
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a reevaluation of migration triggered by the pandemic, a comprehensive rights-based approach could be a vital
grounding for any new migration law. Indeed, efforts to promote the crystallization of a uniform baseline of rights
for all migrants may have a realistic potential to inform the post-pandemic migration law landscape. Two recent
initiatives—one regional, one global—illustrate what might be possible.
Mere months before the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights issued what is arguably the most expansive articulation of the rights of all migrants ever to be issued by an
international body.8 This document, the Inter-American Principles on the Human Rights of Migrants, Refugees,
Stateless Persons and Victims of Trafﬁcking (Inter-American Principles), was the result of a multi-year partnership between
the Commission’s rapporteurship on the rights of migrants and the International Migrants’ Bill of Rights Initiative.9
The Inter-American Principles include several provisions urgently relevant to the challenges of human migration in
the midst of the pandemic. Provisions guarantee cross-border justice and safe return. They also afﬁrm rights to
health, work, just and favorable working conditions, liberty, and security of person. While treatment of all eighty
Inter-American Principles is beyond the scope of this essay, they reﬂect several progressive developments that anchor
their position as a welcome innovation. One particularly interesting provision afﬁrms a right of access to territory
for child migrants regardless of whether they are refugees. Another recognizes a prohibition against discriminatory
or arbitrary expulsion, afﬁrming that individualized status determination is a necessary safeguard.
A second initiative emerged in the early days of the pandemic, when experts drafted Principles of Protection for
Migrants, Refugees, and Other Displaced Persons (14 Principles).10 This document articulates how rights—to nondiscrimination, health, privacy, and non-return to harm, among others—apply to migrants. It also afﬁrms that
human rights treaty provisions ensuring basic guarantees in times of crisis apply to migrants. The 14 Principles
hew closely to existing law and jurisprudence. But they still contain several notable provisions. For example,
while recognizing state power to restrict movement where demonstrably necessary to the health of individuals
and the community, the 14 Principles reﬂect a robust view of liberty of movement both between and within states.
The Principles also use the language of “access to territory” and note that the law bars blanket exclusion of refugees
and asylum-seekers without ensuring status determination procedures and protection from refoulement. The document was recently cited by the UN Secretary-General for the proposition that the human rights of people on the
move in the time of COVID-19 have not been sufﬁciently taken into account.11 To date, more than one thousand
experts (including both of us) have endorsed it as an authoritative articulation of the law.
Comprehensive rights frameworks are perhaps most useful as states consider wholesale overhauls of entire
areas of law and policy, as may happen in response to the pandemic. As states consider these overhauls, civil society,
including in partnership with human rights bodies at the regional and global level, should afﬁrm soft law principles on
migrants’ rights as a way for states to crystallize existing law and promote its progressive development.

8

Compare Inter-American Principles on the Human Rights of Migrants, Refugees, Stateless Persons and Victims of Trafﬁcking, INTERAM. COMM’N H.R., Res. No. 04/19 (Dec. 7, 2019) with Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the
Country in Which They Live, UN Doc. A/RES40/144 (Dec. 13, 1985).
9
The multi-year partnership was established between the International Migrants Bill of Rights Initiative and the Commission’s
Rapporteurship in 2015 to adapt a set of Inter-American Principles from the International Migrants Bill of Rights. Adina Appelbaum
et al., International Migrants Bill of Rights, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 9 (2013); see also IMBR-IACHR Guidelines on the Protection of the Rights
of All Migrants in the Americas (Aug. 14, 2015) (memorandum proposing collaboration between the IMBR Initiative’s Georgetown Law
chapter and the Inter-American Commission to develop a set of guidelines on the rights of all migrants in the region) (on ﬁle with authors).
10
One of us co-authored and co-coordinated the drafting of the 14 Principles. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Human Mobility and
Human Rights in the COVID-19 Pandemic: Principles of Protection for Migrants, Refugees, and Other Displaced Persons (May 2020).
11
See Chetail, supra note 4, at 19 n.50.
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Dispelling the Myth of Absolutist Sovereignty: A Role for Soft Law
If the substance and architecture of international migration law have reached an inﬂection point, where do we go
from here? We argue that any normative shift should start with a reexamination of sovereignty and a commitment
to a migration politics built from the perspective of interdependence. Civil society and activist movements
centered on a universal baseline of rights for all migrants may offer one pathway for tempering a monolithic
sovereignty and developing something else in its place.
Scholars have made a compelling case that the conception of unconstrained power to exclude as a fundamental
attribute of sovereignty is most properly understood as an historically contingent development of international law,
and at odds with earlier formulations,12 rather than natural and inevitable. Canvassing the history of international
law suggests that the weight of the doctrine has arguably favored, not an unconstrained power to exclude, but a
qualiﬁed right to migrate: the notion that some migrants in some cases have a right to enter long predates the
contemporary legal order.13 This indicates that there is important work to be done in pushing back against the
incantation that, as a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court put it this past summer, “‘the power to admit or exclude
aliens is a sovereign prerogative’” and a “fundamental proposition[].”14 A framework of rights for all migrants can
do that in ways both expressive and material.
More critically, other scholars have argued that the concept of sovereignty has always been tainted by inequality,
as it “was not simply a European idea extended to peripheral areas [but] developed out of the colonial encounter.”15 Indeed, that both critical and realist approaches cast the entire architecture of international law, and perhaps
international migration law in particular, as a product of power16 complicates any prospect of international law’s
transformative potential, whatever the formal status of the sovereign power to exclude migrants.
In response to such long-standing theoretical debates, and relevant to a project of reimagining international
migration law for the post-pandemic era, one of us has proposed an ethics of new organicism as a normative
basis for a new international law of migration.17 New organicism is grounded in the idea that the universe is intrinsically interconnected while also characterized by fundamental unpredictability. An ethics grounded in interconnection calls into question the basic presumptions of autonomy that undergird extant conceptions of sovereignty.
By challenging absolutist conceptions of sovereignty, these transnational movements strengthen momentum
towards a migration politics of interdependence. Among other things, any systematic reimagining of international
migration law that is to be consistent with this ethical vision must abandon knee-jerk commitments to a vision of
the absolute sovereign power of exclusion that have driven both law- and policy-making (and the violence and
inequality which such exclusion works on migrants).18 It is ﬁtting that a new UN mantra for the post-pandemic
era is that “no one is safe unless everyone is safe.”19
12

See, e.g., James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AJIL 804, 805, 809 (1983).
Id.; see also Vincent Chetail, Sovereignty and Migration in the Doctrine of the Law of Nations: An Intellectual History of Hospitality from Vitoria to
Vattel, 27 EJIL 901 (2016).
14
Dept. Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020).
15
Antony Aghie, “The Heart of My Home”: Colonialism, Environmental Damage and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 445, 448 (1993).
16
Cf. Chantal Thomas, Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observations on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1195, 1220
(2000).
17
Thomas, supra note 5, at 447.
18
For a brilliant argument that might be seen as a prescription consistent with new organicism, see E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as
Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1520 (2019) (arguing that racist and colonial legacies, together with a reformulation of sovereignty
towards interconnectedness, must be seen as grounding a right of entry for migrants as a form of “distributive justice”).
19
See UN Secretary-General, supra note 3, at 3.
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We suggest that civil society and activist movements offer a potential site for building a politics of interdependence, through efforts like those described above, to create and leverage “soft law” that puts pressure on states and
on the absolutist view of sovereignty in particular. As theorists of international relations have put it, “most international law is ‘soft’ in distinctive ways.”20 In the interstitial space of soft law, civil society and activist mobilization
can be a powerful catalyst in the development of legal norms that constrain states as a matter of formal obligation.
This property of political engagement in international lawmaking may offer transformational potential in the ﬁeld
of migration. The success of such engagement may serve as an index of the ability of civil society to develop a
politics of migration reﬂecting interconnection and epitomizing the ethics of new organicism.
Such claims expose the fault lines in our international legal terrain. The assertion of “the right to have rights” on the
part of migrants constitutes in some ways a fundamental challenge to, and in other ways a logical application of, an
international legal system putatively organized simultaneously around sovereign states and individual rights.21 It is a
fundamental challenge in the sense that it claims the right, contra Hannah Arendt’s original observation, as resting not
in formal legal status recognized by states, but rather in the simple fact of humanity. Yet this challenge ﬂows directly
from the normative premise behind individual human rights. When civil society and activist movements push states
to recognize such an underlying right, irrespective of citizenship or other formal immigration status, they, too, contest
the boundaries of international legal inclusion and exclusion that Arendt identiﬁed. In doing so, they engage in a
foundational form of political participation, through the “staging of a dissensus in which those who are deemed
to lack speech make themselves heard.”22 It is through this dissensus, this dissidence—an insistence on claims to
humanity that some states would accord only on a more limited and exclusionary basis—that migrants’ rights movements can potentially reshape the contours of international law for the post-pandemic era.23
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic may create a new opportunity to reimagine international migration law. We suggest
that the success or failure of efforts by civil society and activist movements, including in partnership with regional
human rights bodies, to center the rights of migrants, may provide an index of how and whether the COVID-19
pandemic reshapes the landscape. The two recent efforts described above illustrate the potential role that nonstate actors can play in contesting absolute and exclusionary sovereign prerogatives when it comes to borders.
Through political and legal action, such efforts both address the practical realities of increases in future migration
and engage conceptual debates regarding sovereignty and the nature of international law. In doing so, they expose
the violence and inequality at the heart of an exclusionary regime of international migration law.

Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 421-22 (2000).
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 294 (1951).
22
Andrew Schaap, Enacting the Right to Have Rights: Jacques Rancière’s Critique of Hannah Arendt, 10 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 22, 23 (2011).
Rancière challenges Arendt’s groundbreaking observation as nevertheless being depoliticized and rearticulates it as a site whose boundaries
of inclusion and exclusion are fundamentally contested. See, e.g., Jacques Rancière, Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?, 103 S. ATL. Q. 297
(2004).
23
For one theorization of this process of contestation, see ITAMAR MANN, HUMANITY AT SEA: MARITIME MIGRATION AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016).
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